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Abstract
I argue that a criterion of theoretical equivalence due to Clark Glymour [Nouˆs 11(3), 227–
251 (1977)] does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I
then motivate and state an alternative criterion that does capture the sense of equivalence I
have in mind. The principal claim of the paper is that relative to this second criterion, the
answer to the question posed in the title is “yes”, at least on one natural understanding of
Newtonian gravitation.
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1. Introduction
Are Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravitation (Newton-Cartan Theory)
equivalent theories? Clark Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980) has articulated a natural criterion
of theoretical equivalence and argued that, by this criterion, the answer is “no”.1 I will
argue here that the situation is more subtle than Glymour suggests, by characterizing a
robust sense in which two theories may be equivalent that Glymour’s criterion does not
capture. This alternative sense of equivalence, which is in the same spirit as Glymour’s,
is best construed as a friendly amendment.2 Still, it will turn out that by this alternative
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1Glymour’s criterion has recently been a topic of debate on other grounds: see, for instance, Halvorson
(2012, 2013), Glymour (2013), and Coffey (2014).
2For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the present proposal and other senses of equivalence
in the literature, including Glymour’s cirterion, see Barrett and Halvorson (2015b). For an overview of
applications of the present criterion, see Weatherall (2015a).
Draft of July 18, 2015 PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE!
criterion, Newtonian gravitation is equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation—at
least on one way of construing Newtonian gravitation.3 It follows that there exist realistic
theories that are equivalent in a robust and precise sense, but which apparently disagree
regarding certain basic features of the world, such as whether spacetime is curved.
The paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by briefly reviewing the two versions of
Newtonian gravitation. I will then describe Glymour’s criterion for theoretical equivalence,
according to which the two versions of Newtonian gravitation fail to be equivalent. Next, I
will apply Glymour’s criterion to two formulations of electromagnetism that, I will argue,
should be (and typically are) taken to be equivalent. It will turn out that these theories
fail to be equivalent by Glymour’s criterion of equivalence. In the following sections, I will
develop an alternative notion of equivalence between theories that I will argue does capture
the sense in which these two formulations of electromagnetism are equivalent. I will then
return to the question of principal interest in the present paper, arguing that there are
two ways of construing standard (nongeometrized) Newtonian gravitation. I will state and
prove a simple proposition to the effect that, by the alternative criterion, on one of the two
ways of construing standard Newtonian gravitation (but not the other), it is theoretically
equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation. I will conclude by drawing some morals
concerning the interpretation of physical theories. Proofs of selected propositions appear in
an appendix.
2. Two formulations of Newtonian gravitation
The two theories with which I am principally concerned are Newtonian gravitation (NG)
and a variant of Newtonian gravitation due to E´lie Cartan (1923, 1924) and Kurt Friedrichs
(1927), called “Newton-Cartan theory” or “geometrized Newtonian gravitation” (GNG).4 In
3David Zaret (1980) has also replied to Glymour on this question. But his argument is markedly different
than the one presented here, and Spirtes and Glymour (1982) offer what I take to be an effective reply.
4For background on geometrized Newtonian gravitation, see Malament (2012) or Trautman (1965).
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NG, gravitation is a force exerted by massive bodies on other massive bodies. It is mediated
by a gravitational potential, and in the presence of a (non-constant) gravitational potential,
massive bodies will accelerate. In GNG, meanwhile, gravitation is “geometrized” in much
the same way as in general relativity: the geometrical properties of spacetime depend on
the distribution of matter, and conversely, gravitational effects are manifestations of this
geometry. Despite these differences, however, there is a precise sense, which I will state
below, in which the theories are empirically equivalent. The central question of the paper
is whether they are also equivalent in some stronger sense.
On both theories, spacetime is represented by a four dimensional manifold of spacetime
events, which I will assume throughout is R4. This manifold is equipped with two (degen-
erate) metrics: a temporal metric tab of signature (1, 0, 0, 0) that assigns temporal lengths
to vectors, and a spatial metric hab of signature (0, 1, 1, 1) that (indirectly) assigns spatial
lengths to vectors.5 These are required to satisfy habtbc = 0 everywhere. There always
exists (at least locally) a covector field ta such that tab = tatb; a spacetime is temporally
orientable if this field can be defined globally. In what follows, I will limit attention to
temporally orientable spacetimes. Finally, spacetime is endowed with a derivative operator
∇ that is compatible with both metrics, in the sense that ∇atb = 0 and ∇ahbc = 0 every-
where. Since ∇atb = 0 and R4 is simply connected, there exists a globally defined smooth
function t : M → R such that ta = ∇at. This function allows us to foliate spacetime into
maximal t = const hypersurfaces, each with a positive definite metric induced by hab. These
surfaces represent space at various times; here we assume that each of these hypersurfaces
is diffeomorphic to R3 and complete relative to the metric induced by hab.
With these assumptions, the four elements just described define a classical spacetime,
written (M, ta, h
ab,∇). Matter in both theories is represented by its mass density field, which
is a smooth scalar field ρ. Massive point particles are represented by their worldlines—
5Throughout the paper I use the abstract index notation, explained in Malament (2012, §1.4).
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smooth curves whose tangent vector fields ξa satisfy ξata 6= 0. Such curves are called
timelike.
In this context, NG is the theory whose models are classical spacetimes with flat (Rabcd =
0) derivative operators, endowed with a gravitational potential, which is a scalar field ϕ
satisfying Poisson’s equation, ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ.6 A massive point particle whose worldline
has tangent field ξa will accelerate according to ξn∇nξa = −∇aϕ. In the geometrized
version of the theory, meanwhile, the derivative operator is permitted to be curved and the
gravitational potential is omitted. The curvature field associated with the derivative operator
satisfies a geometrized version of Poisson’s equation, Rab = 4piρtatb, and in the absence of any
external (i.e., non-gravitational) interactions, massive particles traverse timelike geodesics
of this curved derivative operator. In both cases, we take the “empirical content” of the
theory to consist in the allowed trajectories of massive bodies, in the absence of any non-
gravitational force, given a particular mass density.
Given a model of NG, it is always possible to produce a (unique) model of GNG that
agrees on empirical content in this sense.
Proposition 2.1 (Trautman (1965)). Let (M, ta, h
ab,
f
∇) be a flat classical spacetime, let
ϕ and ρ be smooth scalar fields satisfying Poisson’s equation with respect to
f
∇, and let
g
∇ = (
f
∇, Cabc), with Cabc = −tbtc
f
∇ aϕ.7 Then (M, ta, hab,
g
∇) is a classical spacetime;
g
∇ is
the unique derivative operator on M such that given any timelike curve with tangent vector
field ξa, ξn
g
∇nξa = 0 iff ξn
f
∇nξa = −
f
∇ aϕ; and the Riemann curvature tensor relative to
g
∇,
g
R abcd, satisfies (1)
g
Rab = 4piρtatb, (2)
g
Rab
c
d =
g
Rcd
a
b, and (3)
g
Rabcd = 0.
It is also possible to go in the other direction, as follows.
Proposition 2.2 (Trautman (1965)). Let (M, ta, h
ab,
g
∇) be a classical spacetime that sat-
isfies conditions (1)-(3) in Prop. 2.1 for some smooth scalar field ρ. Then there exists a
6Here ∇aϕ = hab∇bϕ.
7The notation ∇′ = (∇, Cabc) is explained in Malament (2012, Prop. 1.7.3).
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smooth scalar field ϕ and a flat derivative operator
f
∇ such that (M, ta, hab,
f
∇) is a clas-
sical spacetime; given any timelike curve with tangent vector field ξa, ξn
g
∇nξa = 0 iff
ξn
f
∇nξa = −
f
∇ aϕ; and ϕ and ρ together satisfy Poisson’s equation relative to
f
∇.
It is important emphasize that the pair (
f
∇, ϕ) in Prop. 2.2 is not unique. A second
pair (
f
∇′, ϕ′) will satisfy the same conditions provided that (1)
g
∇a
g
∇b(ϕ′ − ϕ) = 0 and (2)
f
∇′ = (
f
∇, Cabc), with Cabc = tbtc
g
∇a(ϕ′−ϕ). Note, too, that Prop. 2.2 holds only if conditions
(1)-(3) from Prop. 2.1 are satisfied. The geometrized Poisson equation, condition (1), has
already been assumed to hold of models of GNG; for present purposes, I will limit attention
to models of GNG that also satisfy conditions (2) and (3).8
3. Glymour on theoretical equivalence
I will now turn to Glymour’s account of theoretical equivalence. The underlying intuition
is that two theories are theoretically equivalent if (1) they are empirically equivalent and
(2) they are mutually inter-translatable.9 In general, empirical equivalence is a slippery
concept, but we will not discuss it further. For present purposes, it suffices to stipulate that
the theories being compared are empirically equivalent, in the precise senses described.
The idea behind the second condition, of mutual inter-translatability, is that two theories
should be said to be equivalent if they have precisely the same expressive resources, or in
other words, if anything one can say about the world in one theory can be said equally well in
the other, and vice versa. Glymour makes this criterion precise via the notion of definitional
8 Note that throughout this section, one could substitute “gravitation field” for “gravitational potential”
by replacing every instance of ∇aϕ with a smooth vector field ϕa satisfying ∇[aϕb]. The choice makes no
difference to the results below, though some readers may think a theory committed to a gravitational field
is more plausible than one committed to a gravitational potential.
9Glymour does not state that empirical equivalence is a necessary condition for theoretical equivalence,
though he does appear to take theoretical equivalence to be strictly stronger than empirical equivalence,
and, as Sklar (1982) emphasizes, empirical equivalence is a substantive interpretive constraint that goes
beyond any formal relations between two theories.
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equivalence in first order logic.10 Suppose that L and L+ are first-order signatures, with
L ⊆ L+. An explicit definition of a symbol in L+ in terms of L is a sentence in L+ that
asserts the equivalence between that symbol (appropriately used) and some formula in L.
Given a theory T in L, by appending explicit definitions of the symbols in L+/L to T , we
may extend T to a theory in L+. The resulting theory is a definitional extension of T in
L+. Now suppose T1 and T2 are first-order theories in signatures L1 and L2, respectively,
with L1 ∩ L2 = ∅. Then T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if and only if there are first
order theories T+1 and T
+
2 in L1 ∪ L2 such that T+1 is a definitional extension of T1; T+2 is a
definitional extension of T2; and T
+
1 and T
+
2 are logically equivalent. Definitional equivalence
captures a sense of inter-translatability in that, given any pair of definitionally equivalent
theories T1 and T2 and a formula % in the language of T1, it is always possible to translate
% into a formula in the language of T2, and then back into a formula in the language of T1
that is T1−provably equivalent to %.11
Definitional equivalence is a natural notion of equivalence for first order theories. But it
is difficult to apply directly to physical theories, since we rarely have first order formulations
available. For this reason, Glymour works with a model-theoretic variant of definitional
equivalence. Suppose T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent theories, and suppose that
A1 is a model of T1. Then it is always possible to expand A1 into a model A of T
+
1 , the
definitional extension of T1. Since T
+
1 and T
+
2 (the extension of T2) are logically equivalent,
A is also a model of T+2 . We may thus turn A into a model A2 of T2 by restricting A to
symbols in the language of T2. The whole process can then be reversed to recover A1. In
this sense, definitionally equivalent theories “have the same models” insofar as a model of
one theory can be systematically transformed into a model of the other theory, and vice
10For details on explicit definability and definitional equivalence, see Hodges (1993, Ch. 2.6). See also the
classic work by de Bouvere (1965b,a), and more recently, Barrett and Halvorson (2015b).
11For more on this sort of translation, see Barrett and Halvorson (2015a).
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versa.12
Using this model-theoretic characterization of definitional equivalence as inspiration,
Glymour proposes the following criterion of equivalence for physical theories expressed in
terms of covariant objects on a manifold.13
Criterion 1. Theories T1 and T2 are theoretically equivalent if for every model M1 in T1,
there exists a unique model M2 in T2 that (1) has the same empirical content as M1 and (2)
is such that the geometrical objects associated with M2 are uniquely and covariantly definable
in terms of the elements of M1 and the geometrical objects associated with M1 are uniquely
and covariantly definable in terms of M2, and vice versa.
GNG and NG fail to meet this criterion. The reason is that, as noted at the end of the last
section, models of NG are not uniquely determined by models of GNG.
4. A problem case for Glymour?
I will presently argue that criterion 1 does not capture an important sense in which two
physical theories may be equivalent. I will do so by displaying two “theories” (actually,
formulations of a single theory) that usually are (I claim correctly) taken to be equivalent,
but which fail to meet Glymour’s criterion. These theories correspond to two ways of
presenting classical electromagnetism on Minkowski spacetime, (M, ηab).
14
On the first formulation of the theory, which I will call EM1, the dynamical variable a
smooth, antisymmetric tensor field Fab on M . This field is called the Faraday tensor; it
represents the electromagnetic field on spacetime. The Faraday tensor satisfies Maxwell’s
equations, which may be written as (1) ∇[aFbc] = 0 and (2) ∇aF ab = J b, where J b is a
smooth vector field representing charge-current density. (Here∇ is the Levi-Civita derivative
12It is essential that one can go from a model A1 of T1 to a model A2 of T2, and then back to the same
model A1 of T1. See Andre´ka et al. (2005).
13Actually, all Glymour claims is that clause (2) of this criterion is a necessary condition for theoretical
equivalence. I am extrapolating when I say that the two clauses together are also sufficient.
14Minkowski spacetime is a (fixed) relativistic spacetime (M,ηab) where M is R4, ηab is a flat Lorentzian
metric, and the spacetime is geodesically complete. For more on these two formulations of electromagnetism,
see Weatherall (2015c).
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operator compatible with ηab.) Models on this formulation may be written (M, ηab, Fab).
15
On the second formulation, which I will call EM2, the dynamical variable is a smooth vector
field Aa on M , called the 4−vector potential. This field satisfies the differential equation
∇a∇aAb −∇b∇aAa = J b. Models may be written (M, ηab, Aa).
These two formulations are systemically related. Given a vector potential Aa on M , one
may define a Faraday tensor by Fab = ∇[aAb]. This tensor will satisfy Maxwell’s equations
for some Ja if Aa satisfies the differential equation above for the same J
a. Conversely,
given a Faraday tensor Fab satisfying Maxwell’s equations (for some J
a), there always exists
a vector potential Aa satisfying the required differential equation (for that J
a), such that
Fab = ∇[aAb]. We stipulate that on both formulations, the empirical content of a model
is exhausted by its associated Faraday tensor. In this sense, the theories are empirically
equivalent, since for any model of EM1, there is a corresponding model of EM2 with the
same empirical content (for some fixed Ja), and vice versa.
But are EM1 and EM2 equivalent by Glymour’s criterion? No. Given any model
(M, ηab, Aa) of EM2, I can uniquely determine a model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1 by taking
Fab = ∇[aAb]. But given a model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1, there are generally many corre-
sponding models of EM2. In particular, if Fab = ∇[aAb] for some 4-vector potential Aa, then
Fab = ∇[aA˜b] will also hold if (and only if) A˜a = Aa + Ga, where Ga is a closed one form
(i.e., ∇[aGb] = 0). Thus uniqueness fails in the EM2 to EM1 direction.
What should one make of this result? On the one hand, Glymour’s criterion seems to
capture something important: the failure of uniqueness suggests that EM2 distinguishes
physical situations that EM1 cannot distinguish. On the other hand, EM1 and EM2 are
usually taken to be different formulations of the same theory; they are intended to have
precisely the same theoretical content. The tension concerns the relationship between the
15Here and in what follows, we do not include the charge-current density in specifications of models of
electromagnetism, as this field can be uniquely reconstructed from the other fields, given Maxwell’s equations.
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models of EM2. The transformations between models of EM2 associated with the same
Faraday tensor are often called “gauge transformations”. On their standard interpretation,
models related by a gauge transformation are physically equivalent, in the sense that they
have the capacity to represent precisely the same physical situations.16 Thus EM2 does not
distinguish situations that EM1 cannot. And indeed, it seems to me that there is a clear and
robust sense in which two theories should be understood as equivalent if, on their standard
interpretations, they differ only with regard to features that, by the lights of the theories
themselves, have no physical content.
5. An alternative criterion
Thus far, I have introduced a criterion of theoretical equivalence and argued that it fails
to capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. In the present section, I will
present a criterion of equivalence that does capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are
equivalent. To motivate this new criterion, note first that there are actually two reasons
that EM1 and EM2 fail to meet Glymour’s criterion. The first problem concerns the failure
of a model of EM1 to correspond to a unique model of EM2. In particular, if we want a sense
of theoretical equivalence that captures the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent to
one another, we need to be able to accommodate the possibility that not all of the structure
of models of EM2 is salient. That is, we want a sense of unique recovery up to physical
equivalence.
One way to make this idea precise is to modify the definition of models of EM2. Instead
of characterizing a model as a triple (M, ηab, Aa), we might take a model to be a triple
(M, ηab, [Aa]), where [Aa] is the equivalence class of physically equivalent vector potentials,
[Aa] = {A˜a : A˜a = Aa + Ga for closed Ga}. This approach explicitly equivocates between
physically equivalent vector potentials. Call the theory whose models are so characterized
16The status of the vector potential arguably changes in quantum mechanics. See Belot (1998).
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EM′2.
Proposition 5.1. For any model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1, there is a unique model (M, ηab, [Aa])
of EM′2 such that Fab = daXa for every Xa ∈ [Aa].
Thus we do have unique recovery of models of EM′2 from models of EM1.
We still face a second problem, however. This problem concerns what is meant by
“covariant definability”.17 Glymour does not make this notion precise, and it is not obvious
that there is a unique or particularly natural way to do so that would meet all of the
desiderata one might impose on a notion of “definability”. To see the difficulty, observe that
even in first order logic, a distinction is made between “explicit definition” and “implicit
definition”, and there are a number of substantive and subtle theorems that show that these
different notions of definability are equivalent.18 In general, though, these theorems do not
hold in other logics—including second order logic, where implicit and explicit definability
come apart in general.19 But if there are, at least in principal, different notions of definability
available, none of which has been made precise in the present context, it is hard to know
how to proceed.
To be sure, this issue does not really arise in Glymour’s own treatment of NG and GNG,
or in the relationship between EM1 and EM2 as discussed in the previous section. The
reason is that the failures of uniqueness in both cases show that, whatever one means by
covariant definability, one will not be able to produce the necessary definitions. But the
problem becomes acute once we move to EM′2, where Prop. 5.1 guarantees that we do have
unique recovery. It is just not clear what the further requirement of “covariant definability”
amounts to.
17I am particularly grateful to Thomas Barrett and Jeff Schatz for discussions about and suggestions on
this paragraph and the next two. But they should not be held responsible for what I say!
18The classic results here are Beth’s theorem and Svenonius’ theorem. See Hodges (1993, Theorem 6.64
& Corollary 10.5.2) and the surrounding discussion.
19For a survey of definability properties in various logics, including second order logic, see Makowsky and
Shelah (1979); see also Craig (1965), Gostanian and Hrbacek (1976), and, for a more accessible treatment,
Andreka and Ne´meti (2014).
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To address this problem, let us return to Glymour’s original argument. Recall that the
basic strategy was to adapt definitional equivalence to a setting more conducive to analyzing
physical theories by identifying a model theoretic consequence of definitional equivalence.
Now, though, we see that Glymour’s criterion is not as well suited to evaluating physical
theories as it appeared to be. But we need not abandon the basic strategy, of looking to
relations between collections of the models of definitionally equivalent theories. One such
relation that seem particularly attractive concerns not bare sets of models, as in Glymour’s
condition, but rather categories of models associated with definitionally equivalent theories.20
In particular, if theories T and T ′ are definitionally equivalent, then their categories of models
are isomorphic.21
This observation suggests the following alternative criterion of equivalence.
Criterion 1′. Two theories are theoretically equivalent just in case there exists an isomor-
phism between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
I call this criterion 1′ because it bears a very close relationship to Glymour’s original criterion.
For one, criterion 1′ is motivated by the same basic intuition about inter-translation as
criterion 1: in both cases, the basic idea is that two theories are equivalent if I can take
whatever one theory says about the world and translate it, in some appropriate sense,
20A category consists of (1) a collection of objects A,B,C . . .; (2) a collection of arrows f, g, h . . .; and
(3) assignments to each arrow f of a pair of objects, dom(f) and cod(f), called the domain and codomain
the arrow, respectively. (We abbreviate this by f : dom(f)→ cod(f).) We require that for any arrows f, g
such that cod(f) = dom(g), there exists an arrow g ◦ f : dom(f) → cod(g) called the composition of f and
g; and for any object A, there exists an arrow 1A : A → A called the identity arrow. Together, these must
satisfy: (1) for any arrows f, g, h, if (h ◦ g) ◦ f exists, then (h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ (g ◦ f); and (2) for any arrow
f : A → B, f ◦ 1A = f = 1B ◦ f . The category of models of a theory T has models of T as objects and
elementary embeddings as arrows. For more on categories and the related notions described below, see Mac
Lane (1998), Borceux (2008), or Leinster (2014), among many other excellent texts. For more on the present
proposal for understanding theoretical equivalence using category theory, see Halvorson (2012), Halvorson
(2015), Barrett and Halvorson (2015b), and Weatherall (2015a).
21A functor F : C→ D is a map between categories that takes objects to objects and arrows to arrows,
and which preserves identity arrows and composition. Given functors F : C → D and G : D → E, the
composition G◦F , defined in the obvious way, is always a functor. A functor F : C→ D is an isomorphism
of categories if there is a functor F−1 : D→ C such that F ◦F−1 = 1D and F−1◦F = 1C, where 1C : C→ C
and 1D : D→ D are functors that act as the identity on objects and arrows. The result cited in the text is
proved by Barrett and Halvorson (2015b). (The result they state concerns equivalence of categories, to be
discussed below, but in fact they show the stronger thing as well.)
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into the other theory, and vice versa, in a way that loses nothing. We have even adopted
both the same starting point for making this idea of “mutual intertranslatability” precise—
definitional equivalence—and the same strategy for adapting it to the present context, of
moving to models of theories.
This is not to say that the resulting criteria are the same. In fact, even in first order
logic, isomorphism between categories of models is strictly weaker than definitional equiva-
lence.22 In the present context, one might characterize the difference as follows: Glymour’s
criterion attempts to spell out “inter-translatability” using some combination of “semantic”
considerations—translating directly between models of the theory—and “syntactic” ones,
insofar as his criterion requires some notion of “definition”. The present criterion, mean-
while, drops the definability requirement, but adds the requirement that further structure be
preserved by the maps relating the models of the theories—namely, the category theoretic
structure encoding information about automorphisms and other elementary embeddings of
models. One may think of this as capturing the idea that the models of the two theories have
the same structure—and thus, have the capacity to represent the same physical situations.
As hoped, this new criterion is readily applied to physical theories. To do so in the
present case, we define a category EM1 whose objects are models of EM1 and whose arrows
are isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve the Faraday tensor, and a category EM′2
whose objects are models of EM′2 and whose arrows are isometries of Minkowski spacetime
that preserve the equivalence classes of vector potentials.23 Given these categories, we may
then prove the following result.
Proposition 5.2. There exists an isomorphism of categories between EM1 and EM
′
2 that
preserves empirical content.
22Again, this is discussed in full detail in Barrett and Halvorson (2015b). It is not known how much weaker
categorical isomorphism is than definitional equivalence, or Morita equivalence, which is a weakening of
definitional equivalence that allows one to define new sorts. Note that the model theoretic criterion Glymour
begins with is actually equivalent to definitional equivalence (de Bouvere, 1965b), at least in simple cases,
though that is of little comfort if, as I have argued, it cannot actually be applied in realistic cases. See
Glymour (2013) and Halvorson (2013) for a recent discussion of these issues.
23What is meant by “preserve the equivalence classes” is described in more detail in Lemma 5.3, below.
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Prop. 5.2 shows that there is a sense in which EM1 and EM
′
2 are equivalent—namely, the
sense given by criterion 1′.
To get a clearer sense of what is going on, and how Prop. 5.2 relates to criterion 1,
observe that in the course of proving Prop. 5.2, one establishes the following.
Lemma 5.3. Let (M, ηab, Fab) and (M, ηab, F
′
ab) be models of EM1 and let (M, ηab, [Aa]) and
(M, ηab, [Aa]
′) be the unique corresponding models of EM′2. Then an isometry χ : M → M
is such that χ∗(Fab) = F ′ab iff [χ∗(Aa)] = [Aa]
′.24
This result provides a sense in which the models of EM′2 might be said to be implicitly
definable from the models of EM1: any map that preserves a Faraday tensor, as well as
the other structure of Minkowski spacetime, automatically preserves the equivalence class of
vector potentials associated with that Faraday tensor, and vice versa. One might even think
of this result as establishing a perfectly good sense in which models of EM′2 are (implicitly)
covariantly definable from models of EM1 after all.
So much for EM1 and EM
′
2. But what about EM2, the alternative formulation of electro-
magnetism we began with? After all, it was this theory that we originally wanted to claim
was equivalent to EM1. We may define a category of models of this theory, too: as a first
pass, we take EM2 to be the category whose objects are models of EM2 and whose arrows
are isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve the vector potential. But this category
is not isomorphic to EM1—and so, on this representation of EM2, EM1 and EM2 are still
not equivalent, even by criterion 1′. The problem is the same as with Glymour’s criterion:
there is a failure of unique recovery.
We have already argued that this sort of non-uniqueness is spurious, at least on the
standard interpretation of EM2, because models related by a gauge transformation should
be counted as physically equivalent. The category EM2 does not reflect this equivalence
24Here χ∗ is the pushforward along χ, defined for differential forms because χ is a diffeomorphism. Note
that, if we dropped reference to ηab, we could consider a broader collection of maps: namely, constant
conformal transformations, which also always preserve both Fab and [Aa]. But this choice will play no role
in what follows.
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between models, because in general, two models that differ by a gauge transformation will
not be isomorphic in this category. On the other hand, we also know that there is another
class of mapping between models that does reflect this sort of physical equivalence—namely,
the gauge transformations themselves. These maps do not appear as arrows in the category
EM2, which suggests that if we want to represent EM2 accurately, in the sense of representing
it in a way that accords with what structure we take to be physically significant on the
standard interpretation, we need a different category, one that includes information about
the gauge transformations.
We define such a category as follows: we take EM2 to be the category whose objects are
models of EM2 and whose arrows are pairs of the form (χ,Ga) : (M, ηab, Aa)→ (M, ηab, A′a),
where Ga is closed and χ is an isometry that preserves the (gauge transformed) vector
potential Aa +Ga, in the sense that χ
∗(A′a) = Aa +Ga.
Proposition 5.4. EM2 is a category.
Note that EM2 is naturally understood to include the arrows of EM1, which may be iden-
tified with pairs of the form (χ, 0), the gauge transformations, which are arrows of the form
(1M , Ga), and compositions of these.
Intuitively speaking, EM2 is the result of taking EM2 and “adding” arrows correspond-
ing to the gauge transformations. Simply adding arrows in this way, however, does not yield
a category that is (empirical-content-preservingly) isomorphic to EM1. The reason is that
the extra arrows do not address the failure of unique recovery. But that does not mean this
exercise was in vain. Although there is not an isomorphism between EM1 and EM2 that
preserves empirical content, there is an equivalence of categories that does so.25
Proposition 5.5. There is an equivalence of categories between EM1 and EM2 that pre-
serves empirical content.
25An equivalence of categories is a pair of functors F : C→ D and G : D→ C that are almost inverses in
the sense that given any object A of C, there is an isomophism ηA : A→ G◦F (A), where these isomorphisms
collectively satisfy the requirement that for any arrow f : A→ B of C, ηB ◦ f = G ◦F (f) ◦ ηA; and likewise,
mutatis mutandis, for any object of D.
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Equivalent categories may be thought of as categories that are isomorphic “up to object
isomorphism”—which is precisely the notion of equivalence we argued we were looking for
between EM1 and EM2 at the end of the last section.
The considerations in the last paragraph suggest a new, still weaker criterion.
Criterion 2. Two theories are theoretically equivalent just in case there exists an equiva-
lence between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
Prop. 5.5 establishes that EM1 and EM2 are theoretically equivalent by this new criterion—
so long as we represent EM2 by EM2, rather than EM2. It is in this sense, I claim, that
the two formulations of electromagnetism should be taken to be equivalent.
What can be said about this sense of equivalence? In fact, the same interpretation can be
given for criterion 2 as for criterion 1′. Once again, we are capturing a sense in which models
of one theory can be “translated” into models of another theory, and then back, without
losing any information—or in other words, the models of the two theories have the same
structure, and one can map between models of the two theories without losing that structure.
The difference between 1′ and 2 comes down to whether we require the “translation” to be
unique, or merely unique up to isomorphism. But if our goal is to capture the idea that the
models of the two theories have the same amount of structure, then it is hard to see why
we would want more than uniqueness up to isomorphism, since after all, isomorphic models
have the same structure, qua models of the theory in question.26
As a final remark, let me observe that criterion 2 also captures the sense in which
EM2 and EM
′
2 are equivalent. In particular, these theories are not equivalent by criterion
1′, even though EM′2 and EM2 may seem to be equally good ways of capturing “gauge
equivalence” in a formal representation of EM2. This reflects the more general fact that for
26More generally, Barrett and Halvorson (2015b) show that if two theories are Morita equivalent, which
is similar to definitional equivalence, but with the flexibility to define new sorts, then their categories of
models are equivalent, but not necessarily isomorphic. So there is reason to think that even in the first
order case, we should be interested in categorical equivalence, rather than isomorphism.
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most mathematical purposes, equivalence of categories is a more natural and fruitful notion
of “sameness” of categories than isomorphism. It also suggests that criterion 1′ is at best
an awkward half-way point once we have begun thinking in the present terms.
6. Are NG and GNG theoretically equivalent?
With these new criteria in hand, we now return to the question at the heart of the paper.
To apply either criterion to NG and GNG, however, one first needs to say what categories
we will use to represent the theories. For GNG, there is a clear choice. We represent GNG
by the category GNG whose objects are classical spacetimes (M, ta, h
ab,∇) satisfying the
required curvature conditions from Prop. 2.1, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that
preserve the classical metrics and the derivative operator.27
NG is more complicated, however. There is a natural option for the objects: they are
classical spacetimes with gravitational potentials (M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ), where ∇ flat. But we
face a choice concerning the arrows, corresponding to a choice about which models of NG
are physically equivalent.
Option 1. One takes models of NG that differ with regard to the gravitational potential to
be distinct.28
Option 2. One takes models of NG whose gravitational potential and derivative operators
are related by the transformation ϕ 7→ ϕ′ = ϕ + ψ and ∇ 7→ ∇′ = (∇, tbtc∇aψ),
for any smooth ψ satisfying ∇a∇bψ = 0, to be equivalent.29
27Given a diffeomorphism χ : M →M ′ and derivative operators ∇ and ∇′ on M and M ′ respectively, we
say that χ preserves ∇ if for any tensor field λa1···arb1···bs on M , χ∗(∇nλa1···arb1···bs ) = ∇′nχ∗(λa1···arb1···bs ).
28 Alternatively, one could replace “gravitational potential” with “gravitational field” to yield a distinct,
and perhaps more plausible, option. (Recall footnote 8.) But the difference does not matter for the present
discussion.
29Note that, since all of the derivative operators considered in NG and GNG agree once one raises their
index, one can characterize the gauge transformation with regard to any of them without ambiguity.
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In the second case, one takes the gravitational potential to be a gauge quantity, much like
the vector potential in electromagnetism. In the first case, one does not.
These two options suggest different categories. In particular, we define NG1 to be the
category whose objects are as above, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that preserve
the classical metrics, the derivative operator, and the gravitational potential, and we define
NG2 to be the category with the same objects, but whose arrows are pairs (χ, ψ), where
ψ is a smooth scalar field satisfying ∇a∇bψ = 0, and χ is a diffeomorphism that preserves
the classical metrics and the (gauge transformed) derivative operator ∇′ = (∇, tbtc∇aψ)
and gravitational potential ϕ + ψ. The first category corresponds to option 1, while the
second corresponds to option 2. Since these options correspond to different interpretations
of the formalism, I will treat them as prima facie distinct theories, labeled as NG1 and NG2,
respectively, in what follows.
What considerations might lead one to prefer one option over the other? The first option
better reflects how physicists have traditionally thought of Newtonian gravitation. On the
other hand, this option appears to distinguish between models that are not empirically
distinguishable, even in principle. Moreover, there are physical systems for which option
1 leads to problems, such as cosmological models with homogeneous and isotropic matter
distributions, where option 1 generates contradictions that option 2 avoids.30 These latter
arguments strike me as compelling, and I tend to think that option 2 is preferable. But I
will not argue further for this thesis, and for the purposes of the present paper, I will remain
agnostic about these options.
We may now ask: are any of these theories pairwise equivalent by either criterion? None
of these theories are equivalent by criterion 1′, effectively for the reason that NG and GNG
30For more on this point, see the debate between John Norton (1992, 1995) and David Malament (1995).
Arguably, Newton himself recognized the empirical equivalence of models related by these transformations—
for instance, see the discussions of Corollary VI to the laws of motion in DiSalle (2008); see also Saunders
(2013); Knox (2014); Weatherall (2015b).
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Condition 1′ Condition 2
NG1 and NG2 Inequivalent Inequivalent
NG1 and GNG Inequivalent Inequivalent
NG2 and GNG Inequivalent Equivalent
Table 1: A summary of the equivalences and inequivalences of NG and GNG, by the standards set by
conditions 1′ and 2.
fail to be equivalent by Glymour’s original criterion.31 Moreover, NG1 is not equivalent to
either GNG or NG2 by criterion 2. But GNG and NG2 are equivalent by criterion 2.
Proposition 6.1. There is an equivalence of categories between NG2 and GNG that pre-
serves empirical content.
The situation is summarized by table 1.
7. Interpreting physical theories: some morals
I have now made the principal arguments of the paper. In short, criterion 1 does not capture
the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. However, there is a natural alternative
criterion that does capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. And by this
criterion, GNG and NG are equivalent too, if one adopts option 2 above. Moreover, criterion
2 highlights an important distinction between two ways of understanding NG.
There are a few places where one might object. One might say that no formal criterion
captures what it would mean for two theories to be equivalent.32 One might also reject the
significance of the particular criteria discussed here. I do not agree with these objections,
but I will not consider them further. For the remainder of this paper, I will suppose that
criterion 2 does capture an interesting and robust sense in which these theories may be
equivalent. If this is right, there are several observations to make.
31Note, however, that one could construct an alternative presentation of NG2 analogous to EM
′
2, in such
a way that this would be equivalent to GNG by criterion 1′. Moreover, if one restricts attention to the
collections of models of NG and GNG in which (1) the matter distribution is supported on a spatially
compact region and (2) the gravitational field (for models of NG) vanishes at spatial infinity, then NG1,
NG2, and GNG are all equivalent by both criteria.
32For versions of this worry, see Sklar (1982) and Coffey (2014).
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First of all, the arguments here support one of Glymour’s principal claims, which is that
there exist empirically equivalent, theoretically inequivalent theories. This is because even
if NG2 and GNG are theoretically equivalent, NG1 and GNG are still inequivalent, even
by condition 2. Glymour’s further claim that GNG is better supported by the empirical
evidence, on his account of confirmation, is only slightly affected, in that one needs to
specify that GNG is only better supported than NG1. This makes sense: the reason, on
Glymour’s account, that GNG is better supported than NG is supposed to be that NG
makes additional, unsupported ontological claims regarding the existence of a gravitational
potential.33 But one can understand the difference between NG1 and NG2 in this way
as well, since NG2 explicitly equivocates between models that differ with regard to their
gravitational potentials.
There is another purpose to which Glymour puts these arguments, however. There is
a view, originally due to Poincare´ (1905) and Reichenbach (1958), that the geometrical
properties of spacetime are a matter of convention because there always exist empirically
equivalent theories that differ with regard to (for instance) whether spacetime is curved or
flat.34 Glymour argues against conventionalism by pointing out that the empirical equiva-
lence of two theories does not imply that they are equally well confirmed, since the theories
may be theoretically inequivalent. But the present discussion suggests that there is another
possibility that is not often considered: theories that attribute apparently distinct geometri-
cal properties to the world may be more than just empirically equivalent. They may provide
different, but equally good, ways of representing the same structure in the world.
As I have just noted, one way of understanding NG2 is as a theory on which the gravita-
tional potential is not a real feature of the world, because the gravitational potential is not
33Once again, one could substitute “gravitational field” for “gravitational potential,” mutatis mutandis.
Recall footnotes 8 and 28.
34For a clear and detailed description of the positions that have been defended on the epistemology of
geometry in the past, see Sklar (1977); see also Weatherall and Manchak (2014).
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preserved by mappings that reflect physical equivalence. GNG, meanwhile, does not make
any reference to a gravitational potential. In this sense GNG and NG2 appear to have the
same ontological implications, at least with regard to gravitational potentials. Still, GNG
and NG2 do differ in one important way. In particular, in generic models of GNG, spacetime
is curved. In all models of NG2, meanwhile, spacetime is flat. Now, interpreting this second
fact is somewhat subtle. Since we have taken models of NG2 to be equivalent if they are
related by gauge transformations that in general do not preserve derivative operators—even
though they do preserve curvature—it is not correct to say that models of NG2 represent
spacetime as flat, since in fact, they do not posit any particular parallel transport properties.
Another way of making this point is to observe that although in all models of NG2, parallel
transport of vectors is path independent, the result of parallel transporting any particu-
lar vector along a given (fixed) curve will generally vary even between equivalent models,
because the derivative operator varies with gauge transformations.35
One might conclude from this that GNG provides a more perspicuous representation
of spacetime geometry, since the apparent geometry of the models of NG2 is obscured by
the gauge transformations.36 But there is another option available. As Weatherall (2015b)
shows, there is some geometrical structure shared by all isomorphic models of NG2, beyond
just the metric structure: namely, they all agree on a standard of rotation. In other words,
we may think of models of NG2 as positing enough structure to say when a body (say) is
rotating, but not enough to say that it is undergoing unaccelerated (inertial) motion, full
stop.37
In any case, one thing seems clear. Models of GNG represent spacetime as curved,
whereas models of NG2 do not. Thus, at least in this context, there is a sense in which
35I am grateful to Oliver Pooley for pressing this point.
36Knox (2011) makes a closely related point.
37In other words, one might think of the models of NG2 as having the structure of Maxwell-Huygens
spacetime, as in Weatherall (2015b); see also Saunders (2013) and Knox (2014).
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classical spacetime admits equally good, theoretically equivalent descriptions as either curved
or not. Let me emphasize that this view is not a recapitulation of traditional conventionalism
about geometry. For one, it is not a general claim about spacetime geometry; the view here
depends on the details of the geometry of classical spacetime physics. Indeed, there is
good (though perhaps not dispositive) reason to think that general relativity, for instance,
is not equivalent to a theory on which spacetime is flat, by any of the criteria discussed
here.38 More generally, I do not believe that it is a matter of convention whether we choose
one empirically equivalent theory over another. I agree with Glymour that there are often
very good reasons to think one theory is better supported than an empirically equivalent
alternative. Rather, the point is that in some cases, apparently different descriptions of the
world—such as a description on which spacetime is flat and one on which it is curved—
amount to the same thing, insofar as they have exactly the same capacities to represent
physical situations. In a sense, they say the same things about the world.
The suggestion developed in the last paragraph will worry some readers. Indeed, one
might be inclined to reject criterion 2 (or even criterion 1′) on the grounds that one has
antecedent or even a priori reason for thinking that there is, in all cases, an important
distinction—perhaps a metaphysical distinction—between a theory that says spacetime is
curved and one that does not. Two theories that disagree in this regard could not both be
true, because at most one could accurately reflect the facts about the curvature of spacetime,
and thus, two such theories could not be equivalent. I think this position is probably tenable.
But it seems to me to get things backwards. At the very least, there is another way of looking
at matters, whereby one allows that the distinctions that one can sensibly draw depends on
the structure of the world. And the best guide to understanding what those distinctions are
will be to study the properties of and relationships between our best physical theories.
38See Knox (2011) and Weatherall and Manchak (2014) for evidence supporting this claim.
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Prop. 5.1.
Suppose there were vector potentials Aa and A˜a such that [Aa] 6= [A˜a], but for every Xa ∈
[Aa], ∇[aXb] = ∇[aA˜b] = Fab. Then ∇[a(Xb] − A˜b]) = 0 for every Xa ∈ [Aa], and thus
Xa − A˜a is closed for every Xa ∈ [Aa]. Thus [Aa] ⊆ [A˜a]. A similar argument establishes
that [A˜a] ⊆ [Aa]. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3.
Suppose we have an isometry χ s.t. χ∗(Fab) = F ′ab. Then for every Xa ∈ [Aa], we have
χ∗(∇[aXb]) = χ∗(Fab) = F ′ab. But exterior derivatives commute with pushforwards along
diffeomorphisms, and so χ∗(∇[aXb]) = ∇[aχ∗(Xb]) = F ′ab. Thus by Prop. 5.1, [χ∗(Aa)] =
[A′a]. Conversely, if χ∗(Aa) ∈ [Aa], then F ′ab = ∇[aχ∗(Ab]) = χ∗(∇[aAb] = χ∗(Fab). 
Proof of Prop. 5.2.
The isomorphism is given by F : EM ′2 → EM1 acting on models as (M, ηab, [Aa]) 7→
(M, ηab,∇[aAb]) and acting on arrows as the identity. That this yields an isomorphism is an
immediate consequence of Prop. 5.1, Lemma 5.3, and basic facts about the composition of
pushforward maps. 
Proof of Prop. 5.4.
EM2 includes identity arrows, which are pairs of the form (1M , 0); (2) it contains all compo-
sitions of arrows, since given any two arrows (χ,Ga) and (χ
′, G′a) with appropriate domain
and codomain, (χ′, G′a)◦(χ,Ga) = (χ′◦χ, χ∗(G′a)+Ga) is also an arrow; and (3) composition
of arrows is associative, since given three pairs (χ,Ga), (χ
′, G′a), and (χ
′′, G′′a) with appropri-
ate domain and codomain, (χ′′, G′′a) ◦ ((χ′, G′a) ◦ (χ,Ga)) = (χ′′, G′′a) ◦ (χ′ ◦χ, χ∗(G′a) +Ga) =
(χ′′ ◦ (χ′ ◦ χ), χ∗ ◦ χ′∗(G′′a) + χ∗(Ga)′ + Ga) = ((χ′′ ◦ χ′) ◦ χ, χ∗(χ′∗(G′′a) + G′a) + Ga) =
(χ′′ ◦ χ′, χ′∗(G′′a) +G′a) ◦ (χ,Ga) = ((χ′′, G′′a) ◦ (χ′, G′a)) ◦ (χ,Ga). 
Proof of Prop. 5.5.
It suffices to show that there is a functor from EM2 to EM1 that is full, faithful, and
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essentially surjective, and which preserves Fab. Consider the functor E : EM2 → EM1
defined as follows: E acts on objects as (M, ηab, Aa) 7→ (M, ηab,∇[aAb]) and on arrows as
(χ,Ga) 7→ χ. This functor clearly preserves Fab. It is also essentially surjective, since given
any Fab, there always exists some Aa such that ∇[aAb] = Fab. Finally, to show that it is
full and faithful, we need to show that for any two objects (M, ηab, Aa) and (M, ηab, A
′
a), the
induced map on arrows between these models is bijective. First, suppose there exist two
distinct arrows (χ,Ga), (χ
′, G′a) : (M, ηab, Aa) → (M, ηab, A′a). If χ 6= χ′ we are finished, so
suppose for contradiction that χ = χ′. Since by hypothesis these are distinct arrows, it must
be that Ga 6= G′a. But then Aa +Ga 6= Aa +G′a, and so χ∗(Aa +Ga) 6= χ∗(Aa +G′a). So we
have a contradiction, and χ 6= χ′. Thus the induced map on arrows is injective. Now consider
an arrow χ : E((M, ηab, Aa))→ E((M, ηab, A′a)). This is an isometry such that χ∗(∇[aAb]) =
∇[aA′b]. It follows that χ∗(∇[aAb] − ∇[aχ∗(A′b])) = 0, and thus that ∇[aAb] − ∇[aχ∗(A′b])
is closed. So there is an arrow (χ, χ∗(A′a) − Aa) : (M, ηab, Aa) → (M, ηab, A′a) such that
E((χ, χ∗(A′a)− Aa)) = χ, and the induced map on arrows is surjective. 
Proof of Prop. 6.1.
This argument follows the proof of Prop. 5.5 closely. Consider the functor E : NG2 → NG1
defined as follows: E takes objects to their geometrizations, as in Prop. 2.1, and it acts
on arrows as (χ, ψ) 7→ χ. This functor preserves empirical content because the geometriza-
tion lemma does; meanwhile, Prop. 2.2 ensures that the functor is essentially surjective.
We now show it is full and faithful. Consider any two objects A = (M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ) and
A′ = (M ′, t′a, h
′ab,∇′, ϕ′). Suppose there exist distinct arrows (χ, ψ), (χ′, ψ′) : A → A′, and
suppose (for contradiction) that χ = χ′. Then ψ 6= ψ′, since the arrows were assumed to be
distinct. But then ϕ+ψ 6= ϕ+ψ′, and so (ϕ+ψ) ◦ χ 6= (ϕ+ψ′) ◦ χ. Thus χ 6= χ′ and E is
faithful. Now consider any arrow χ : E(A)→ E(A′); we need to show that there is an arrow
from A to A′ that E maps to χ. I claim that the pair (χ, ϕ′ ◦ χ − ϕ) : A → A′ is such an
arrow. Clearly if this arrow exists in NG2, E maps it to χ, so it only remains to show that
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this arrow exists. First, observe that since χ is an arrow from E(A) to E(A′), χ : M →M ′ is
a diffeomorphism such that χ∗(ta) = t′a and χ∗(h
ab) = h′ab. Moreover, χ∗(ϕ+ (ϕ′ ◦χ−ϕ)) =
χ∗(ϕ′◦χ) = ϕ′◦(χ◦χ−1) = ϕ′, so χ maps the gauge transformed potential associated with A
to the potential associated with A′. Now consider the action of χ on the derivative operator
∇. We need to show that for any tensor field λa1···arb1···bs , χ∗(∇˜nλa1···arb1···bs ) = ∇′nχ∗(λa1···arb1···bs ), where
∇˜ = (∇, tbtc∇a(ϕ′ ◦χ−ϕ)) is the gauge transformed derivative operator associated with A.
We will do this for an arbitrary vector field; the argument for general tensor fields proceeds
identically. Consider some vector field ξa. Then χ∗(∇˜nξa) = χ∗(∇nξa − tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ−
ϕ)) = χ∗(
g
∇nξa − tntmξm∇aϕ− tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ)) = χ∗(
g
∇nξa)− χ∗(tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ)),
where
g
∇ = (∇, tbtc∇aϕ) is the derivative operator associated with E(A). Now, we know
that χ : E(A) → E(A′) is an arrow of GNG, so χ∗(
g
∇nξa) =
g
∇nχ∗(ξa). Moreover, note
that the definitions of the relevant Cabc fields guarantee that ∇aλa1···arb1···bs =
g
∇a(λa1···arb1···bs ) and
similarly for ∇′ and
g
∇′. Thus we have χ∗(
g
∇nξa) − χ∗(tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ)) =
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa) −
t′nt
′
mχ∗(ξ
m)∇′a(ϕ′ ◦ (χ ◦ χ−1)) =
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa) − t′nt′mχ∗(ξm)∇′aϕ′ = ∇′nχ∗(ξa), where
g
∇′ =
(∇′,−tbtc∇aϕ′) is the derivative operator associated with E(A′). So χ does preserve the
gauge transformed derivative operator. The final step is to confirm that∇a∇b(ϕ′◦χ−ϕ) = 0.
To do this, again consider an arbitrary vector field ξa on M . We have just shown that
∇′aχ∗(ξb) − χ∗(∇aξb) = −χ∗(tatmξm∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ − ϕ). Now consider acting on both sides
of this equation with ∇′a. Beginning with the left hand side (and recalling that ∇ and
∇′ are both flat), we find: ∇′n∇′aχ∗(ξb) − ∇′nχ∗(∇aξb) = ∇′a
g
∇′nχ∗(ξb) − χ∗(∇a
g
∇nξb) =
g
∇′a
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa)−t′at′m(∇′bϕ′)
g
∇′nχ∗(ξm)−χ∗(
g
∇a
g
∇nξb)+χ∗(tatm(∇bϕ)
g
∇nξm) = χ∗(tatm(∇b(ϕ−
ϕ′ ◦ χ))
g
∇nξm). The right hand side, meanwhile, yields −∇′n(χ∗(tatmξm∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ − ϕ)) =
χ∗(tatm(∇nξm)∇b(ϕ−ϕ′ ◦χ))+χ∗(tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ−ϕ′ ◦χ)). Comparing these, we conclude
that χ∗(tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ− ϕ′ ◦ χ)) = 0, and thus tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ− ϕ′ ◦ χ) = 0. But since ta
is non-zero and this must hold for any vector field ξa, it follows that ∇a∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ) = 0.
Thus E is full. 
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